Introduction
Constitutions are seldom made by the will of men. Time makes them. They are introduced gradually and in an almost imperceptible way. Yet there are circumstances in which it is indispensable to make a constitution. But then do only what is indispensable. Leave room for time and experience, so that these two reforming powers may direct your already constituted powers in the improvement of what is done and the completion of what is still to be done.
Benjamin Constant, 1814. constitutions must incorporate silences in order to permit 'time and experience' to 'improve' and 'complete' their work -is more challenging still. Constant requires us to reflect on the significance of recent attempts to fill those constitutional silences so as to 'improve' and 'complete' the constitutional project.
Modern Constitutions

Making a Constitution
There comes a time in the history of nation-states when it is deemed necessary to 'make' a constitution. The modern practice arises from the late-eighteenth century American and French revolutions whose intellectual driving force was the European Enlightenment. The belief that individuals have natural rights, that government acquires its authority from the people, and that the purpose of government is to promote the common good could only be realized by devising a new concept of constitution. Until then, political constitutions were inchoate expressions of a nation's culture, manners, and practices of governing. In its new conception, a constitution is drafted in the name of the people, defines the powers of the main institutions of government, and delineates the relationship between government and its citizens. This new sense of constitution yields a new understanding of 'fundamental law': no longer a set of historic practices sanctified by tradition, the term now confers on enacted constitutional law the status of 'higherorder' law that regulates the processes of 'ordinary' law-making.
A written constitution is the product not only of political enlightenment but also of technological innovation. The invention of mass printing techniques and the consequent growth in literacy enhanced the power of the printed word. The growing use of written constitutions also coincides with a profound change in political structures. The American and French revolutions had overthrown imperial powers, 4 asserted the claims of national sovereignty, and set in train a transition from a world of empires to nation-states. 5 Thereafter, the founding of any new nation-state became a constitutional moment.
The pivotal significance of the American and French revolutions might, at first glance, suggest that constitution-making is a liberal, progressive undertaking that establishes regimes that limit governmental authority, guarantee civil rights, and institute democratic accountability. 'improvement' and 'completion'. But although written constitutions are distinctive expressions of modernization, modernization is itself an ambivalent process. National liberation there may be, but there is always an underside of constraint.
The Silences Imposed by Constitutions
The modern constitution both empowers citizens and controls and disciplines subjects.
By defining competences and entrenching rights, the constitution limits powers and protects liberties, but it also strengthens the authority of the central government vis-à-vis sub-units, 6 marginalizes or subjugates certain groups, 7 or bolsters the hegemony of the dominant power. 8 The constitution projects a particular understanding of political authority. In making the political worldview intelligible it empowers, and by classifying and setting boundaries it 'normalizes' and constrains. 9 The written constitution privileges particular types of speech but also imposes certain silences.
The most significant type of imposed silence arises from the circumstances of their earliest formation. Commonly drafted against a backdrop of revolutionary upheaval or imperial collapse, what many regarded as liberation others experienced as defeat. Since authority depends on achieving civil peace, the constitutional challenge was to find a common framework for moving forward in the face of evident differences. 15 The classic illustration, though it involves a legislative rather than a constitutional rule, is the gag rule that the US House of Representatives adopted in 1836, which stated that no action will be taken on any resolutions relating to the subject of slavery. It was imposed because the intensity of the controversy over the issue of slavery was so dominant that it was preventing the House's ability to conduct normal legislative business. The rule was therefore felt to be necessary to try to preserve the Union. See S. Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995), 213-218.
as part of a peace process that breaks from authoritarianism and establishes democracy, is the immunity offered to the old ruling elites -a vow of silence about past conductfelt to be needed to secure their compliance in making the transition to the new constitutional order.
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The form that is assumed by constitutional democracies, Stephen Holmes notes, 'is undoubtedly determined by obligatory silences, by the strategic removal of certain items from the democratic agenda' and in certain situations it may even be the case that 'issue suppression is a necessary condition for the emergence and stability of democracies'. 17 Constitutional democracies, in short, commonly devise rules which, for the purpose of protecting their regime, silence some types of political utterance.
Constitutional Abeyances
Whenever it is necessary to make a constitution Constant suggests that it should include 'only what is indispensable'. Following extensive deliberation and adoption by popular acclamation, the constitution may have acquired the status of a symbol of the nation's collective values, but it will invariably contain silences and abeyances. These exist not only because of linguistic indeterminacy or an inability to predict the future; they are often the result of a tacit agreement to keep certain contentious political questions in a state of irresolution. Consequently, such silences and abeyances 'can only be assimilated by an intuitive social acquiescence in the incompleteness of a constitution'.
18
Constitutional silences are functional.
Tacit constitutional silences do not arise because the issue has been overlooked: they express the need 'to condone, and even cultivate, constitutional ambiguity as an acceptable strategy for resolving conflict'. 19 Rather than signifying constitutional immaturity, they 'denote an advanced constitutional culture adept at assimilating diverse and even conflicting principles of government within a political solidarity geared to 
Constitutional Interpretation
Constitutions present themselves as devices of settlement but in reality are arrangements that thrive on evasion. And a constitution is able to perform its function only if it maintains its ambiguous meaning. This explains the complexity of constitutional interpretation: a constitution must necessarily be subject to continuous re-interpretation.
This message has recently become obscured. 
The constitution as framework
The idea of the constitution as a framework for regulating political conflicts reflects Constant's sense that the constitution is a bargain struck by political forces at a particular 23 See Martin Loughlin, 'The Constitutional Imagination' (2015) 78 MLR 1-25, esp. 11-16.
historical moment. In that process, agreement on ultimate values is unlikely and the best the constitution can achieve is to establish a procedure through which differences can be negotiated. This generally leads to the division between legislative, executive and judicial tasks. Respecting the coordinate status of these tasks, the constitution provides an arrangement of checks and balances, within which the various gaps and silences avoid imposing a resolution on contentious matters.
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In political regimes with this type of constitution, legality becomes the operating principle and legislation the normal working tool. But if the constitution functions just as a legal framework that 'we the people' have given ourselves, can it ever be elevated above the continuing consensus of the people? Constant's pithy answer to that problem is that What, then, does this idea of the constitution as a framework tell us about the 'filling' of constitutional silences? The main point is that the elimination of silences in the constitutional framework comes about through political judgment, and this is a point that the judiciary implicitly acknowledges. Judges promote a strict sense of legality, confining governmental bodies to the bounds of their lawfully conferred powers. But the corollary of this is that they must not get too involved in trying to fill these constitutional silences. That is, it should not be assumed that courts have the capacity to provide authoritative answers to contentious constitutional questions. Courts assume the mantle 24 Dicey and Rait offer a specific illustration with respect to the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland of 1707. Recognizing that the question of English appellate jurisdiction over Scottish courts was highly sensitive, they note that the terms of Article 19 excluded the possibility of causes arising in Scotland being tried in English courts, but remained silent on the possibility of an appeal from the Court of Session to the House of Lords. They then comment: 'Did the Commissioners, one asks, intentionally leave a difficult question open and undecided? The most obvious, and possibly the truest reply is that such was their intention, and that prudence suggested the wisdom of leaving to the decision of future events the answer to a dangerous inquiry which after all might not arise for years. There must have seemed much good sense in leaving a curious point of constitutional law practically unsettled until by the lapse of twenty years or more everyone should have become accustomed to the workings of the Act of In this conception of the constitution, silences are devices of political management.
The judiciary performs a constructive role in strengthening this framework but, recognizing that its authority is increased when its jurisdiction is constrained, it has also devised a range of techniques to avoid having to decide on matters that might undermine its status. If these silences are to be filled, it is a task for political negotiation and accommodation.
The constitution as an order of values
This notion of the constitution as a framework document has recently been placed in question. The challenge is closely associated with a shift in the foundations of legal thought.
For many contemporary jurists, law is not a set of promulgated rules; it is an arrangement of norms of an intrinsically ethical character. Law is not an expression of will, whether the will of the people that enacts the constitution or the will of the majority formalized in legislation;
it is an elaboration of reason. Law is not voluntas; it is ratio. When law is conceived as a type of public reason, a shift in constitutional understanding occurs. The constitution is conceptualized as a system of higher-order law that governs all legitimate political activity.
The constitution establishes an inherently legal -rather than a political -framework.
In this conception, there can be no political question on which the constitution remains entirely silent, and all are answered in the language of law. There may, of course, The changes promoted by the German Constitutional Court signal a more basic shift in legal thinking. Law as a system of rules to be interpreted and applied according to their plain meaning is replaced by a philosophy that requires each rule to be interpreted against the background of an overarching constitutional order. The effect is that each rule must be interpreted 'as an expression of values' and this may be 'far removed from a literal interpretation of the constitution'. 29 It also assumes that the 'goal of constitutional interpretation is to give the greatest possible effect to these values and to the function which constitutional norms are supposed to play in society under changing conditions'.
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Once the constitution is treated as a value order, all governmental action is subject to the principle of objective justification. may vary but they amount to variants on a common theme: are the measures adopted capable of being justified as necessary and proportionate in accordance with a constitutional order founded on the values of liberal democracy? 31 The silences that once were filled by political judgment after legislative or executive deliberation are now resolved by a judiciary which explicates the value order implicit in the constitution.
Constitutional authority 'shifts from a supposedly binding text to a structure for reviewing the rationality and reasonableness of governmental action' and a form of 'superlegality' emerges which 'governs the choice of conflicting interpretations and the closing of gaps'. 32 This conception of constitution as an order of values leads inexorably to a coalescence of meaning across national boundaries. Each constitution comes to be seen as a system giving effect to a universal order of values. The distinction between public and private is blurred, and so too is that between national and international. 33 Evidence of this can be seen across the world in the remarkable expansion in the constitutional role of courts, the erosion of doctrinal restrictions on jurisdiction (ripeness, mootness, justiciability, etc), the growing influence of international courts, and the growing trade in jurisprudence between national constitutional courts. 34 In the words of former Israeli
Chief Justice, Aharon Barak, 'nothing [now] falls beyond the purview of judicial review; the world is filled with law; anything and everything is justiciable'. 35 There are no gaps, no silences, only a world order of values awaiting interpretation and application by constitutional courts.
The emergence of the constitution as an order of values signals a 'paradigm shift'. 36 In place of the separation of powers between bodies of coordinate jurisdiction, the judiciary presents itself as the ultimate guardian of a values-based constitution. Whether it can fill the silences of the written constitution and sustain a viable order remains debateable.
Trading in abstract principles requires an exercise of political judgment, 37 and this trade is creating a new type of political engagement which is the exclusive preserve of intellectual elites. Strong on abstract theorizing but weak on the transformation of general principles into actual change, it remains uncertain whether this conception of constitutional ordering is able to sustain a robust structure of political authority.
The constitution as administrative order
How How the modern constitution accommodates this development remains contentious, but it is worth noting that the issue was recognized at the moment constitutions were constructed. Consider the argument presented in The Federalist Papers
clashing "values." Freedom, equality, justice, security, self-realization, solidarity, protection of life: today these are all placed side by side as "values" contained in the constitution, without any explanation of why they are "values," and how they -and the practical legal demands that are supposed to arise from themrelate to one another within a hierarchical system.' 38 suggesting that extensive executive powers are required because individual liberties are most threatened by weak and fragmented government. Publius argued specifically that since Article II of the US Constitution, which vests executive power in the President, is couched in general terms that permit a variety of meanings, that power must be given a generous interpretation. He rested his argument on proportionality, that 'the means ought to be proportioned to the end'. 40 The impact of this principle was considerable.
Since the government is entrusted with the safety and well-being of the state and the factors that endanger this are infinite, Publius claimed that 'no constitutional shackle can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed'. 41 Failure to confer 'a degree of power commensurate to the end', he elaborated, 'would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigour and success'. 42 Whether Publius was justifying an extensive executive prerogative or referring to national government in general is debateable, though the evidence suggests his argument applies to both. 43 Being silent on the matter, the Constitution neither grants nor denies an executive prerogative power; it may not authorize executive prerogatives but it implicitly allows them. This silence, then, is one that the government fills.
With the growth of governmental power, the constitutional imagery of checks and balances is marginalized; it is supplanted by the idea that government must evolve according to political necessities and this is something that the constitution must accommodate. The 1787 document remains the US Constitution, noted Woodrow
Wilson in 1885, 'but it is now our form of government in name rather than in reality'. 44 The 'irresistible power of the federal system', he explained, has relegated 'some of the chief balances of the Constitution to an insignificant role in the "literary theory" of our institutions'. 45 Wilson later argued that government had outstripped its constitutional forms and the office of the President had become the crucial pivot on which the will of the people is converted into effective governmental action. 46 The key contemporary challenges, he suggested, are not constitutional but administrative, to be met with strong, centralized and united executive action. Here, then, the silences of the Constitution are filled by executive power and constitutional interpretation must respect that administrative reality.
Wilson was writing at a time when governmental growth was closely linked to a progressive political agenda. But continuous growth in governmental regulatory powers has since has made it a more contentious factor, especially among those who claim we are now living through a permanent 'state of exception'. 47 Irrespective of political disagreements, it is recognized that administrative agencies work with such a broad delegation of power that this provides a platform for their claim to an independent authority, and they are established in this form not only because they remain best placed to respond to contemporary risks but also because legislatures and courts simply lack the capacity to exercise effective oversight. 48 Somek calls this phenomenon 'empowering proportionality', though perhaps it might more accurately be labelled 'proportionate empowering'. Government's powers, he suggests, must be proportionate to the magnitude of the threats that society faces. When dealing with the unknown, the powers of existing executive offices must implicitly be extended. Empowering proportionality is 'the iron law of an ever more expansive executive branch.' 49 This is a contentious development, but it had from the outset been implicitly incorporated into the structure of modern constitutions. These silences are, arguably, now being exploited in a more systematic fashion, 50 and they lead to the principle of strict legality, which was adopted in the idea of constitution as a framework, now being replaced by a facilitative method in which normativity 'is thrown into an expressive mode'. 51 Sometimes they are there simply to be filled through subsequent constitutional interpretation, 52 but often they are the consequence of a conscious determination to leave unresolved certain matters on which consensus is not possible. Whatever the reason, it is generally accepted that the constitution establishes a framework within which -and over which -further political deliberation takes place. And for much of the modern period of constitution-making it has been understood that filling these silences is a political task on to which the judiciary's authority to offer solutions is distinctly limited.
This conventional understanding has recently been challenged in thought and practice. That challenge has come from two main sources. It comes first from constitutional lawyers who, pursuing the implications of a paradigmatic shift in legal thought, assert that the constitution expresses an order of values that permeate the entire social order. This implies that there are no gaps and no silences to be filled through political negotiation; there are only interpretative ambiguities on which judges, as guardians of that order, are well-equipped to generate the 'right answer'. This shift from constitution as 'framework order' to 'values-order' reveals a significant contrast in the otherwise fruitless debate in the Anglo-American literature over 'political constitutionalism' versus 'legal constitutionalism'. The differences between these conceptions can more accurately be expressed by drawing a distinction between legality and legitimacy. In modern practice, the distinction between legal authority and political legitimacy was clearly understood but in the 'values-order' conception legality and legitimacy have become blurred.
There is a second source of challenge to the idea that the constitution establishes a political framework. This alternative maintains that in the light of the contemporary workings of government, legitimacy is a product of effectiveness. Rather than through some abstract appeal to 'justice', legitimacy is established through the demonstrable material benefits that governments provide. Constitutions acquire legitimacy, it is maintained, by virtue of enabling governments to deliver collective goods efficiently, effectively and proportionately. In this alternative conception, the constitution sanctions administrative action whenever it is needed to meet the risks its citizens face. The silences of written constitutions are filled in accordance with administrative necessities operating through a principle of proportionality.
These two recent movements now threaten to supplant Constant's reforming 52 See Rosalind Dixon, 'Constitutional drafting and distrust' (2015) 13 ICON 819-46 (comparative study of implications of variations in length and specificity of constitutions).
